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The Impact of Sustainability Reporting on Firm Profitability
Abstract
Using a hand-collected representative sample of 95 publicly traded American firms from various sectors in
2015-2016, I examine how corporate sustainability reporting affects the financial performance of firms. I find
a positive and significant effect of sustainability reporting on a firm’s return on equity, return on assets, and
profit margin in the subsequent year. However, this relationship is found only for firms with low institutional
ownership. These results suggest that sustainability reporting would be a worthwhile use of corporate
resources for this subset of firms. Further, corporate sustainability reporting is shown to be an effective
substitute for monitoring by institutional investors.
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 Introduction 
Corporations are becoming increasingly critiqued on the negative impacts of their 
business operations on employees, society, and the environment.  As the pronounced effects of 
corporate mismanagement become highlighted from oils spills, accounting fraud, and employee 
mistreatment, companies face tremendous ramifications from their negligence which oftentimes 
results in bankruptcy, loss of value, hits to firm reputation, and public distrust.  When culprits 
like BP1 were placed under scrutiny and examination by investigators after the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster in 2010, it was clear to see that the company’s failures were almost entirely 
inevitable.  Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the University of California-Berkeley, 
comments specifically on the fatal flaws of BP’s breach saying, "It's clear that the problem is not 
technology, but people” (Hoffman, 2010). This sentiment can be attributed to many other 
companies that knowingly cut corners to achieve short-term gains.  
As success oftentimes breeds complacency, when a company becomes engulfed in 
attaining more and more, it can begin to cause excessive environmental degradation, disregard 
corporate regulations, and threaten employee safety – further alarming customers, employees, 
suppliers, governments, and investors.  These parties are pushing corporate management to 
assume responsibility and undertake additional measures towards becoming more socially 
responsible.   
Known as corporate social responsibility (CSR), this business practice takes into 
consideration employee wellbeing, the broader community it serves, and environmental 
protection.  Despite well-established regulatory measures through agencies like the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that ensure 
public company compliance and accountability, malpractice still occurs.  Destructive business 
decisions result in plummeting stock prices and destroy brand reputation, ultimately affecting not 
only markets and shareholders, but also third parties.  The obvious and destructive potential of 
firms and their management are being noticed.  Realizing this, many firms are aware that they 
can no longer act as detached entities that disregard society and the environment.   
In attempt to mediate concerns, some firms have begun to devote more company 
resources toward socially responsible activities, whereas others refuse to participate on belief 
that CSR is not aligned with profit maximization.  Firms that do invest in reporting on their non-
financial performance may do so to be transparent to shareholders or believe that it may aid in 
profit generation; however, it is unknown if and to what extent sustainability reporting may 
affect firm profitability. Acknowledging the fact that there are many other factors that contribute 
to firm profitability rather than just CSR, this analysis will specifically focus on whether or not 
engaging in sustainability reporting is in the best interest of the firm when it is looking to 
enhance value in the short-term.  If CSR reporting does enhance firm profitability it would be a 
worthwhile investment to firms and not merely a tactic that wastes corporate resources or 
something that is just “nice to do.”  
 
 
                                                        
1 In 2010, one of BP’s oilrigs exploded, resulting in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  Killing 11 workers and 
spewing an estimated 200 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, this event is known to be one of the worst 
environmental disasters in American history, as it affected marine and aquatic life and the fishing industry  
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 Literature Review 
This paper adds to the literature on corporate social responsibility and firm profitability 
by examining the relationship between some measure of corporate social responsibility – 
sustainability reporting – and profitability. CSR, for the sake of this paper, will be used 
interchangeably with sustainability reporting and non-financial reporting.  I seek to address how 
sustainability reporting influences profitability, depending on the varying amounts of 
institutional ownership.  In doing so, I see how different levels of institutional ownership impact 
a company decision on whether or not to engage in reporting. 
 
Sustainability Reporting 
A sustainability report as defined by the Global Reporting Initiative2 (GRI) is, “a report 
published by a company or organization about the economic, environmental and social impacts 
caused by its everyday activities.”  As researchers struggle on adequately measuring corporate 
social responsibility, sustainability reporting will act as the proxy for CSR in this econometric 
analysis. 
 These reports further enable companies to provide information regarding the non-
financial aspects of its operations, ultimately allowing companies to actively engage in a solution 
towards improving firm accountability, transparency, and corporate image.  As a pioneer in 
sustainability reporting, the GRI has transformed sustainability reporting into a practice that is 
adopted by organizations all over the world.  Whether impacts are positive or negative, a 
sustainability report also encompasses the company’s values, governance model, and its 
approach towards creating a sustainable global economy.  Much like the financial documentation 
required for public companies, non-financial reporting can also allow markets to respond to ever-
changing conditions, keep shareholders informed, and provide an element of transparency into 
firm activity.  Reporting on other areas such as the economic, social, and environmental profile is 
becoming an adopted practice throughout the world, as there is an emerging trend of firms 
reporting on non-financial issues (Kolk, 2003; KPMG, 2015).  Although compliance and 
disclosure of CSR reporting is mandatory in some regions and countries3, it still remains a 
voluntary measure in the United States.   
Through the creation of the Sustainability Reporting Standards4 the GRI has alleviated 
much of the confusion on how to properly report since the strategies used to create reports can 
vary widely, as there are no specific accounting principles for social disclosure.  The GRI reports 
92 percent of the world’s largest 250 corporations report on their sustainability performance, and 
74 percent of those companies use GRI Sustainability Standards, demonstrating the wide 
                                                        
2 The GRI operates as an independent international organization that works towards communicating the impact of 
business on critical sustainability issues (i.e. climate change, human rights, corruption, etc.). 
3 Non-financial reporting has become a mandatory practice instituted by governments throughout Europe but 
particularly the EU Commission who has transitioned to requiring large companies to publish regular reports on the 
social and environmental impacts of their activities. This is exemplified the transitional phase from the EU Accounts 
Modernization Directive (2003) to the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive (2014).  The directive applies only to 
large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees, which encompasses nearly 6,000 companies 
(European Commission, 2014).  Since the European Commission promotes the interests of the European Union, the 
directive involves the EU’s 28 member countries.  
4 The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards include distinctive elements that help indicate the impact of 
companies on critical sustainability issues.  These elements include: multi-stakeholder input, a record of use and 
endorsement, governmental references and activities, independence, and shared development costs.  The standards 
are a trusted reference for policy makers and regulators worldwide as they encourage and enable credible non-
financial reporting by the companies under their jurisdictions (Global Reporting Initiative). 
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 recognition and acceptance of these principles.  Kolk (2003), through evaluating trends in 
sustainability reporting, found the practice is much more common in industrial sectors and less in 
the financial sector, demonstrating that certain sectors that are subject to high risks report more 
than others whose day-to-day operations are not creating imminent harm or danger5.  This may 
be the case for companies that have high-risk operations that could cause large scale 
environmental degradation or human rights and employee safety violations; however, it could be 
argued that companies in the financial sector are more susceptible to risk and market fluctuations 
and can disrupt capital markets – affecting many market segments and the livelihood of 
consumers. 
In addition, if sustainability reports are not assured by a credible source6, the report may 
not accurately reflect the company’s reality in terms of sustainable practices.  The GRI’s 
“External Assurance of Sustainability Reporting” report seeks to inform reporters and readers as 
to why quality assurance is important.  Using the national auditing framework, the International 
Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000 and AA1000AS, assurers seek to increase the 
robustness, accuracy and trustworthiness of non-financial and sustainability disclosures.  
Assurers are divided into three groups, accountancy, engineering, and sustainability service 
firms, each having expertise in different areas to address a company’s needs.  This quality 
assurance allows reports to be approved by a verifiable, external source and enhance 
transparency of firm activity. 
Looking back on BP, the company has engaged in assured sustainability reports since 
1998, prior to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010.  After the incident stock prices 
plummeted for the company.  Nevertheless, BP has institutional ownership of around 10.5 
percent, and if it were part of this study’s sample, it would be considered a firm with low 
institutional ownership.  Despite their sustainability reports being assured, an important aspect 
was overlooked and not included in their reports, something so crucial that ended up being a 
major contribution in the Deepwater explosion.  In BP’s 2010 sustainability report, its assurer, 
Ernst and Young, states a key limitation to their review was that, “Our work did not include 
physical inspections of any of BP’s operating assets.”  Operating assets are assets acquired for 
use in the conduct of the ongoing operations of a business which can include fixed long-term 
assets such as a company’s plant and equipment.  In BP’s case – its oil rig.  This goes to show 
that sustainability reports can be crucial in ascertaining areas that companies should and need to 
address. 
 
Non-financial Reporting and Profitability 
The relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm profitability has 
produced inconsistent results, providing no conclusive evidence whether the relationship is 
positive, negative, or neutral (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997; and Orlitzky, 2001).  Despite reporting on social performance being a 
voluntary measure, Anderson and Frankle (1980) found that returns to portfolios consisting of 
                                                        
5 Industrial sectors may more involved with reporting due to requirements such like the Conflict Minerals rule 
(2012) that was required by the SEC’s 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Act, mandating certain publicly-traded 
manufacturing companies to review or audit the origin of their minerals  (Securities and Exchange Commission).  
Because certain materials used in production are oftentimes outsourced from other countries that are subject to civil 
conflict and human rights abuses, this rule obligates these manufacturing companies to annually report if what they 
produce contains “Conflict Minerals.” These minerals essentially include: tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold  
(Reuters). 
6 Auditing firms like Ernst & Young. 
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 securities of only firms that disclosed information on their social performance were preferable 
compared to non-disclosing firms.  Their findings indicate that social disclosure has information 
content, and that the market values this disclosure positively.  Additionally, examining the 
impact of pollution control expenditures disclosures on the stock market, Belkaoui (1976) found 
that companies that disclosed their pollution control expenditures showed a temporary, but 
substantial, increase in stock market performance after disclosure7.  These findings suggest that 
managers should allocate a proportion of their resources towards reporting on their attempts to 
mitigate the harmful impacts of their business operations – especially those in industries whose 
operations could be remarkably destructive.   
 
Corporate Governance and Profitability 
Since corporate governance plays an integral part in a firm’s overall wellbeing, how it is 
governed should impact its profitability.  Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016) found that well-
governed firms that suffer less from agency problems engage more in CSR.  Their results show a 
positive relation between CSR and value, suggesting that engaging in CSR can be a means of 
generating more returns to investors.  
Corporate mismanagement is a strong reason why investors, employees, and society push 
for the firm to engage in socially responsible behavior.  Even though existing laws and 
regulations dictate company actions regarding accounting practices, corporate governance 
procedures, and direct environmental impacts8, compliance by firms may still sometimes waver.  
Disregard for various laws and safety regulations has resulted in some of the most prominent 
environmental disasters and human rights violations caused by corporations.  These occasions 
don’t just occur by happenstance, but by negligent behavior to amass profusion – while society 
bears the cost.  As executives attempt to increase company profits over a given time, they may 
cut costs in critical areas of operation.  Not only does this behavior have tremendous external 
consequences, it can also be felt internally through the destruction of firm value, making it 
extremely difficult for a firm to recover its reputation.  As executives are at the forefront of 
making many major decisions involving tradeoffs, the way CEOs are compensated for their job 
can contribute to how management decisions are made.   
Some question to what extent are these lapses in managerial decision-making influenced 
by corporate incentives.  Compensation for large public firms is given by some form of equity in 
the company – stocks and options – which can be a key driver of many decisions (good or bad) 
made within the firm.  Minor (2016) explored how executive compensation through high-
powered incentives can significantly increase the likelihood of environmental law breaking and 
magnitude of environmental harm.  The findings suggest that even though incentives are 
intended to create positive outcomes, they also have the power to increase misconduct from 
                                                        
7 In this study, prior to disclosure of pollution control expenditures, the disclosing companies performed poorly 
compared to the market.  The period of four months after disclosure, the stocks of these disclosing companies 
performed better than the market, indicating significant reactions to disclosure.   The reactions had an immediate but 
temporary effect on the market.   
8 Reflective of laws including but not limited to: the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Securities Act 
(1933), Securities Exchange Act (1934), Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (2010); the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Air Act (CAA) (1970), 
Clean Water Act (CWA) (1972), Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (1974), Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) (1976), Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) (1986), Pollution 
Prevention Act (PPA) (1990), and the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) (1976). 
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 CEOs.  Ultimately, CEO responsibility for critical environmental events is crucial due to the 
amount of compensation incentives – making insider ownership9 an important control variable. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility – An Agency Issue? 
Concerns over the engagement in corporate social responsibility deal with the question on 
where a firm’s responsibility should primarily lie: with shareholders, society – or both?  
Corporate finance literature discusses the issue surrounding the agency problem as the existence 
of a conflict of interest between a firm’s management and stockholders.  If the managerial team 
is expected to act in the shareholder’s best interests (i.e. maximize shareholder value), then it 
becomes questionable whether or not a firm should act in a socially responsible manner as a 
viable reason towards achieving increases in value.  
The argument for CSR suggests that socially responsible firms that are more engaged in 
addressing not only value maximization, but also environmental protection and social equality, 
are better off in the long run. The practice is increasingly adopted by companies and can be seen 
in the eye of many firms as a measure to maintain a competitive advantage, attain socially 
responsible investors, and use corporate resources effectively towards bettering their corporate 
image.  By signaling to the world their firm’s “goodness,” through product designations such as 
organic, animal-free tested, and made in the USA, companies encourage their customers to feel 
that through consumption they are making a difference. Not only do society and consumers value 
these tactics, but investors also push for similar strategies like that of non-financial reporting.  
Companies are now getting certified as B Corps (B corporations)10, realizing that they are 
interdependent and need to redefine what “success” means in business – creating companies that 
serve society and shareholders. Additionally, the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, the equivalent to 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 index but for socially responsible firms in the U.S., allows investors 
to access stocks of companies that have been designated as socially responsible for their positive 
environmental, social, and governance characteristics11.  Another example, MSCI KLD scores, 
help sustainability conscious investors better analyze companies by comparing firms to industry 
equivalents on their triple bottom line performance based upon five key environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) factors12. These internal and external environments are increasingly 
persuading companies to at least consider participating in CSR to appeal to customers and 
investors.  
Alternatively, the argument against CSR is that it is a waste of corporate resources.  
Stubbs, Higgins, & Milne (2013) found that sustainability reporting is considered by some 
managers to be unnecessary, time consuming, and expensive, and just a marketing technique – 
all of which divert firm management from devoting their energy into other core responsibilities.   
Additionally, these non-disclosing firms may not have sufficient discretionary income to 
                                                        
9 Insiders are company directors or senior officers and any person or entity that beneficially owns more than 10% of 
a company’s voting shares.   However, insider trading encompasses those who trade company shares based on 
knowledge that is not available or accessible to the public (i.e. the condition of the company, future plans, etc.) 
10 B Corps are for-profit companies certified by the nonprofit B Lab to meet rigorous standards of social and 
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.  B Corps consist of more than 2,100 companies from 
50 countries and are representative of 130 industries  (B Lab). 
11 Launched in May 1990 as the Domini 400 Social Index, the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index is one of the first 
socially responsible (SRI) indexes. Since May 31, 1994 it has had average annual returns of 9.89%. (MSCI, 2017) 
12 The five MSCI KLD key environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors include: environment, community 
& society, employees & supply chain, customers, and governance & ethics.  Created by KLD Research & Analytics 
Inc., these criteria aid in socially responsible investing (SRI). 
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 contribute to social activities despite interest in doing so.  A firm does not undertake 
sustainability reporting because there is little pressure to do so by the company, its culture or 
business structure, society, or stakeholders.  The findings suggest that managers of firms are not 
oblivious or ignorant of the social and environmental impacts of their operations.  They believe 
that there are more direct and effective ways of dealing with firm issues than devoting resources 
to produce reports.  One suggestion is that the responsibility to encourage more participation in 




Various financial organizations, funds, or endowments purchase outstanding shares to 
obtain an ownership stake in a company in large part to exert influence upon management of that 
particular firm.  These investors have the ability to enact change within the organization through 
threatening to sells their shares, voicing concerns to the board of directors, or remaining passive 
or ambivalent in corporate decision making.  Due to the fact that executives may have extensive 
wealth wrapped up in the organization, as their holdings incentivize them to oversee managerial 
decisions, these institutional investors are oftentimes regarded as corporate monitors in firms in 
which they invest.  Gillan and Starks (2003) found that institutional investors are the primary 
actors that prompt change in many corporate governance systems whereby these large 
shareholder groups increase the monitoring of the firm’s management.  Existing literature 
discusses the role of institutional investors as corporate monitors, as they too have considerable 
amounts of wealth dependent on the success of the company; therefore, the size of the stake held 
by institutional investors influences their power in a firm.  Investors with large positions want to 
ensure that these investments are handled with care.   
Maug (1998) suggested that the amount of influence institutional investors carry is 
dependent on the amount they hold in the company.  When there are high institutional holdings, 
shares are less marketable, leading investors to hold on for longer periods of time.  With low 
institutional holdings, investors can easily liquidate their shares and have minimal interest and 
incentive to adequately act as monitors. This incentivizes these institutional owners to adequately 
monitor management to protect their investment.  Those with higher holdings typically are more 
interested in long-term profitability, so they act as responsible corporate monitors to the firms 
they invest in. Their close involvement within these firms can yield tremendous power and 
influence upon firm decision-making, especially when investors demand the firm to act in a more 
socially responsible manner.  The more shares owned by these investors, the greater power and 
control they yield within a firm that can lead to significant changes within the firm. 
Additionally, Ferreira and Matos (2008) discovered firms with higher ownership by 
foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, 
and lower capital expenditures.   In terms of the effect of institutional ownership on enhancing 
firm performance, Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian (2007) found that there is a 
significant relationship between operating cash flow returns and institutional ownership. These 
findings stem from a subset of institutional investors, those who are less likely to have business 
relationships with the firm. Classified as “pressure insensitive” investors (i.e. investment 
companies and independent investment advisors), they may be more likely to impose more 
disciplinary action on the firms they invest in.  These results suggested that institutional investors 
with close business ties to the firm compromise their ability to act as diligent monitors to the 
6
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 organization and its management13. Ultimately, the extent of the financial impact of institutional 
investor ownership on firm profitability is still unclear. 
 Institutional investors are increasingly interested in firm management especially if the 
company is underperforming.  Their initiative in corporate governance can lead to extensive 
changes if they sternly demand it, as they have the capability and power to threaten to sell shares 
if corporate leadership does not meet their expectations which could lower firm value or signal 
the ineffectiveness in corporate leadership.  Although many of the prior studies discuss the 
impact of institutional investors as being advantageous to the high valuation of firms, there is 
still no direct link between whether firms that engage in sustainability reporting yield a higher 
financial performance after they engage in reporting. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Using cross-sectional data, I examine the impact of sustainability reporting on firm 
financial performance with the relative impact of high and low amounts of institutional 
ownership. Return on equity, return on assets, and profit margin (dependent variables), were 
used as proxies for firm profitability.  Corporate sustainability reporting (independent variable) 
was measured as a dummy variable.  Firms were assigned a value; one if it reported in 2015 and 
zero otherwise.  Control variables reflecting capital structure (total debt to equity and revenue) 
and firm ownership (percent held by insiders and percent held by institutions) were also included 
as additional determinants of corporate profitability.  The relationship between corporate 
sustainability reporting and profitability is estimated in the following regression model: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟𝑡 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒𝑡 + 𝑢 
 
Control Variables 
The primary focus is of the impact of sustainability reporting on firm performance.  
However, there are other internal corporate and financial mechanisms that serve to influence firm 
profitability and are necessary for this analysis.  These control variables, which have been 
included and examined in prior research, include firm size, ownership, and capital structure.  I 
discuss these in turn. 
I. Firm size. Firm size has been considered as an important determinant of firm 
profitability and is included as a performance measure in many alternative studies.  Moreover, I 
employ the inclusion of firm size as a control variable, as the size of firm does tend to influence 
profitability in some, but not necessarily in all industries (Hall & Weiss, 1967; Marcus, 1969; 
Abiodum, 2013). Revenue14 will serve as a proxy control variable for firm size and as denoted in 
the regression equation; 𝑙𝑟 (log of revenue) will be used to best fit the model.  
ii. Capital structure. The capital structure of a firm is the amount of debt and or equity it 
uses to finance its operations and growth. Although there is no model for optimal capital 
structure, financing can be achieved with various combinations of securities and sources of 
funding, depending on firm preferences.  The impact of leverage can be a strategy firms use to 
finance operations and augment their return on investment (ROI), making it a crucial control 
variable in this analysis.  The debt-to-equity ratio15 will be used as a proxy to measure this 
                                                        
13 Disclosure: Although this is implied the study does not directly prove this relationship. 
14 Revenue is defined as the amount of money the firm receives over an annual period. 
15 Debt/Equity Ratio is a debt ratio is calculated by dividing a company's total liabilities by its stockholders' equity.  
A high debt/equity ratio generally means that a company has been aggressive in financing its growth through the 
assumption of debt. (Investopedia) 
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 financial leverage.  It is indicative of how much debt the company is using to finance its assets 
relative to its total shareholder equity, essentially creating a figure that assesses the degree to 
which this borrowed money, used to fund projects, increases firm value.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) theorize that the existence of debt and outside equity is the origin of the agency problem, 
as corporate leveraging techniques can be a source of conflict between management and 
shareholders.   
Assuming large amounts of debt to fund projects can be one of those techniques that 
promote disagreement between the two parties.  Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2011) found that there 
is a positive relationship between capital structure and profitability16.  Noting that interest 
payments on debt are tax deductible, taking on debt in the capital structure aids in the 
profitability of the firm – ultimately suggesting that the higher the debt, the higher the 
profitability of the firm.  Financial leveraging can provide some tax benefits to a firm, since 
interest on debt is tax deductible; however, there are increased risks on defaulting on that debt 
when there are higher levels of debt. 
I used this model for six sub-sample regressions to conduct a comparison of the effects of 
whether or not firms were split between high and low institutional ownership. 
𝑟𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
𝑟𝑜𝑎ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
𝑟𝑜𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
 
𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑙𝑟 + 𝐵3𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝐵4𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐵5𝑑𝑒 + 𝑢 
 
Where 𝐵0 is the constant of the regression equation, and 𝐵1, 𝐵2, 𝐵3, 𝐵4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵5 are the respective 
coefficients for csr, lr, inside, institution, and de.  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the dependent variable for 
firm profitability ratios in 2016, measured by return on equity, return on assets, and profit 
margin, and 𝑢 is the error term (see appendix A for variable descriptions).   
All variables are taken from time period 𝑡 = 2016 except the dependent variable 𝑐𝑠𝑟, 
which is taken from time period 𝑡 − 1 =  2015.  A lag is placed on the 𝑐𝑠𝑟 variable (𝑡 − 1) 
while the other variables in the regression are kept contemporaneous (𝑡) to mitigate the issue of 
reverse causality17.  This means that using 𝑐𝑠𝑟 (𝑋) from the year prior than the profitability 
measures rules out profitability (𝑌) as being the reason that firms engage in sustainability 
reporting.  If sustainability reporting does affect firm profitability, it presumably would do so 
prior to the year of better or worse performance. I hypothesize that firms that engage in 
sustainability reporting will demonstrate better financial performance.  That is, a positive 
relationship will exist such that companies decide to report in the prior year, their return on 
equity, return on assets, and profit margin will increase in the following year. 
Information on company’s sustainability reporting tendencies was retrieved from the 
Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Disclosure Database from the year 2015.  The 
                                                        
16 Using data from 272 publicly listed American firms in the service and manufacturing industries over a period of 
three years (2005-2007), Gill, Biger, and Mathur (2011) assess short-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to total 
assets, and total debt to total assets on profitability (return on equity) – while using sales growth and firm size as 
controls. 
17 Reverse causality means that X and Y are associated, but not in the way you would expect. Instead of X causing a 
change in Y, it is really the other way around: Y is causing changes in X. 
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 complete version of data had to be requested from the organization through submission of the 
“GRI Reports List Request Form.” This detailed database provides an aggregate overview of all 
reports published from 1999 till present. As an undergraduate student, the complete version of 
the GRI Reports List was free of charge with proof of enrollment at a college institution. With 
permission to use the GRI’s complete compilation of data, I agreed to not share any raw data 
from the list with third parties.  This list provides access to all types of sustainability reports, 
whether GRI-based or otherwise, and other information relevant to the companies that report.  
A data set was constructed from the GRI’s selection of companies to include 95 publicly 
traded American companies from various industries that either reported or did not report in the 
year 2015.  I used a stratified random sampling method18 to get a balance of companies from a 
wide variety of sectors that reported and did not report in 2015.  For each company, data were 
collected on each firm’s profit margin, return on assets, return on equity, revenue, percentage 
held by insiders, and percentage held by institution.  All financial data were gathered using 
Yahoo Finance for the year 2016.  Financial data from the subsequent year, from when a firm 
reported or did not report, were used to predict current values of the dependent variable, thus 
avoiding reverse causality.  I consider the sample to be a representative sample of American 
firms across a variety of sectors that did or did not choose to report. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.  All variables were calculated using 
the data analysis and statistical program Stata.  Total observations fluctuated for each variable 
due to some missing data or data that were not applicable to that firm.  In the non-reporters 
category, total observations came to 41 firms.  The average profitability indicators for this group 
are as follows: return on equity at 16.81percent, return on assets at 5.73 percent, and profit 
margin at 8.75 percent.  Other mean values for explanatory variables include revenue at $28.19 
billion, insider ownership at 8.96 percent and institutional ownership at 83.53 percent, and total 
debt to equity ratio at 103.62. 
For the reporting group, total observations came to 54 firms.  The average profitability 
indicators are as follows: return on equity at 26.43 percent, return on assets at 5.99 percent, and 
profit margin at 13.12 percent.  The mean values for the explanatory variables include revenue at 
$41.63 billion, insider ownership is 7.24 percent and institutional ownership is 76.67 percent, 
and a total debt to equity ratio of 204.6.  The median value for reporters in terms of return on 
equity, return on assets, and profit margin is greater than those of non-reporters; however, when 
compared with the mean values, the difference is not as noteworthy.  But it is important to 
examine as the median value is not as influenced by outliers, which indicate that the sample 










                                                        
18 Stratified random sampling is a method of sampling that involves the division of a population into smaller groups 
known as strata. In this method, the strata are formed based on members' shared attributes or characteristics then 
pooled to form a random sample. 
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Table 2 shows sector diversity of the firms within the sample. In order to assess the 
impact of reporting on an entire economy, a representative sample of firms was chosen, not just 
those centered in certain industries.  Firms within the retailers sector constitute the largest group 
















                                                                                   
          institution    79.99663  18.31824      70.7        83        92        89
                   de    161.7909  404.8189    43.215    92.455    138.06        92
               inside    6.830337  14.26082        .2         1      7.31        89
         revenuebil~s    35.82601  61.40034      5.46      12.5      39.3        95
                  ros    11.22526  17.11285       2.9      7.89     14.17        95
                  roa    5.879158  4.825772      2.71      5.07      8.19        95
Total             roe    22.33436  37.05622      7.48     13.58     22.08        94
                                                                                   
          institution    76.66531  18.16866      68.7      78.4      89.2        49
                   de     204.597  526.9617     43.43    101.53    149.29        53
               inside    7.240204  17.35921       .12       .38      6.42        49
         revenuebil~s    41.62667  52.68763      7.44    19.885     55.23        54
                  ros    13.10741   21.5236      3.06     7.615     16.29        54
                  roa    5.992407  5.084704      2.13     5.665      8.78        54
1                 roe    26.42796  45.32911      6.17    13.725     27.79        54
                                                                                   
          institution     84.0775  17.88451     71.15     86.95     96.85        40
                   de    103.6185  80.13585     42.73     81.21    123.61        39
               inside     6.32825  9.356071      .295      1.49     9.875        40
         revenuebil~s    28.18613  71.24655      3.61      7.34     15.81        41
                  ros    8.746341  7.955445      2.81      7.99     13.66        41
                  roa        5.73  4.519958      3.01      4.58      7.47        41
0                 roe      16.808  20.67888     8.645     13.58    20.695        40
                                                                                   
csr          variable        mean        sd       p25       p50       p75         N
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Table 2 - Distribution of Firms by Sector 
 
                          Total           95      100.00
                                                                    
                Water Utilities            3        3.16      100.00
               Waste Management            3        3.16       96.84
                           Toys            1        1.05       93.68
                Tourism/Leisure            1        1.05       92.63
                        Tobacco            2        2.11       91.58
           Textiles and Apparel            4        4.21       89.47
             Telecommunications            3        3.16       85.26
            Technology Hardware            3        3.16       82.11
                      Retailers            6        6.32       78.95
                    Real Estate            3        3.16       72.63
                       Railroad            1        1.05       69.47
                          Other            3        3.16       68.42
                Metals Products            2        2.11       65.26
                          Media            3        3.16       63.16
                      Logistics            4        4.21       60.00
Household and Personal Products            3        3.16       55.79
            Healthcare Services            3        3.16       52.63
            Healthcare Products            4        4.21       49.47
     Food and Beverage Products            2        2.11       45.26
             Financial Services            4        4.21       43.16
                      Equipment            4        4.21       38.95
               Energy Utilities            3        3.16       34.74
                         Energy            3        3.16       31.58
              Consumer Durables            3        3.16       28.42
         Construction Materials            3        3.16       25.26
                  Conglomerates            4        4.21       22.11
                      Computers            4        4.21       17.89
            Commercial Services            2        2.11       13.68
                      Chemicals            2        2.11       11.58
                       Aviation            3        3.16        9.47
                     Automotive            3        3.16        6.32
                    Agriculture            3        3.16        3.16
                                                                    
                         Sector        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
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 Table 3 provides additional descriptive statistics showing the levels of institutional 
ownership of the firms in the sample.  I used the median value of the sample levels of 
institutional ownership to categorize them as being either high or low in terms of institutional 
ownership in the regression.  Firms above 82.95 percent are considered firms with “high” 
institutional ownership, and firms that fall below that threshold are considered firms with “low” 
institutional ownership.  As a few firms do not have any institutional ownership, the number of 
observations for the regressions decreases.  Therefore, these observations are not included in the 
regression.  When examining the table, institutional ownership exceeds 100 percent, which is 
possible. If an organization holds a certain number of shares, and an institution owns all of those 
shares, of which some are borrowed by a second firm, then in the process of shorting those 
shares to a third institution, the second institution sells a stock that they do not own.  In this 
instance, multiple parties own the share of a stock, thus, institutional ownership exceeds 100 
percent (Asquith, Pathak, & Ritter, 2005). 
 















99%        120.6          120.6       Kurtosis       5.201684
95%        101.8          119.1       Skewness      -1.010017
90%         99.4          105.5       Variance       335.5581
75%           92          104.7
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      18.31824
50%           83                      Mean           79.99663
25%         70.7           40.8       Sum of Wgt.          89
10%         60.6           34.2       Obs                  89
 5%         46.7           18.1
 1%         14.6           14.6
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                    %Held By Institutions
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 Results 
Table 4 Lagged Regression of Profitability - Results Breakdown by “Low” and “High” 
Levels of Institutional Ownership 
 
 
A positive relationship was found between CSR reporting and all measures of 
profitability for firms with low institutional ownership.  Table 4 provides all six regressions and 
associated significance levels.  Regression (1) indicates that sustainability reporting and capital 
structure all have a positive and significant impact on firm return on equity. The coefficient on 
𝑐𝑠𝑟 is positive (22.041) and significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.077).  Moreover, the 
economic impact of sustainability reporting on roe is relatively important.  Holding all other 
variables constant, the model predicts that when a firm decides to switch to reporting, return on 
equity would increase return on equity by 22 percent.  Note that 54.9 percent (𝑅2 = 0.549) of 
the variance of the degree of profitability can be explained by the degree of 𝑐𝑠𝑟, 
𝑙𝑟, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, and 𝑑𝑒.  Regression (3) indicates that sustainability reporting has a 
positive and significant impact on a firm’s return on assets.  The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 is positive 
(3.324) and significant at the 5 percent level (p-value = 0.034).  The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 suggests 
that a firm would experience a 3.324 percent increase in return on assets by engaging in 
sustainability reporting.  Regression (5) demonstrates that 𝑐𝑠𝑟 reporting has a positive and 
significant impact on a firm’s profit margin.  The coefficient on 𝑐𝑠𝑟 (10.719) is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.078).  This result implies that sustainability 
reporting enhances a firm’s profit margin by 10.719 percent. 
The robust results are statistically significant in that sustainability reporting has a positive 
impact on profitability regarding firms with low amounts of institutional ownership.  Firms with 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ownership Low High Low High Low High
Dependent roe roe roa roa ros ros
csr 22.041* -10.809 3.324** -1.634 10.719* 0.552
[0.077] [0.113] [0.034] [0.330] [0.078] [0.925]
ln(revenue) -3.634 4.415 -0.521 1.416* -3.276* 0.466
[0.333] [0.157] [0.267] [0.072] [0.078] [0.864]
Inside -0.329 -0.105 -0.021 -0.082 -0.001 -0.663
[0.402] [0.872] [0.674] [0.611] [0.995] [0.248]
Institution 0.135 -0.619 0.055 -0.062 0.034 -0.371
[0.779] [0.178] [0.362] [0.578] [0.886] [0.349]
Debt/Equity 0.056*** 0.04 0 -0.002 -0.004 0.014
[0.000] [0.315] [0.921] [0.851] [0.378] [0.692]
Intercept 8.206 67.903 1.981 10.406 15.778 44.332
[0.822] [0.154] [0.663] [0.374] [0.377] [0.285]
N 43 42 43 43 43 43
R-sq 0.549 0.219 0.154 0.169 0.132 0.1
p-values in brackets
="* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01"
13
Whetman: The Impact of Sustainability Reporting on Firm Profitability
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2017
 high amounts of institutional ownership do not see the same relationship, and in fact have 
negative relationships between return on equity and 𝑐𝑠𝑟 as well as return on assets and 𝑐𝑠𝑟 
reporting.  The results suggest that firms that decide to report and have low institutional 
ownership could potentially see large increases in return on equity, return on assets, and profit 
margin in the short term.  Sustainability reporting for firms with low institutional ownership 
could act as a substitute for other means in enhancing profitability and monitoring mechanism to 
make them more competitive with other firms. 
 
Conclusion 
I have explored how sustainability reporting impacts the profitability between firms with 
high and low institutional ownership.  It can be extremely beneficial as a substitute in enhancing 
firm profitability where there is an absence, or lack of, significant institutional ownership.  At 
least in this sample, sustainability reporting has significant impact on a firm’s profitability in the 
short-term; however, one size does not fit all.  This study provides an important guide to 
managers by demonstrating not all companies should engage in CSR reporting – only companies 
with low institutional ownership.  These findings suggest that by engaging in sustainability 
reporting, firms with lower institutional ownership show significant improvements in financial 
performance in the subsequent year after reporting.  For companies that lack a large amount of 
institutional ownership and are not necessarily interested or motivated to pursue an active role in 
the corporation, it would be expected that they do not exert much influence over corporate 
governance.  Engaging in sustainability reporting for these firms would prove to be quite 
beneficial in realizing increases in profitability, allowing them an alternate measure or strategy to 
potentially reap huge gains to increase shareholder value when there is an absence or lack of 
institutional ownership.  The key here is that institutional investors have tremendous influence 
because they have the financial firepower to yield significant change in corporate management, 
and if there is a lack of institutional ownership, sustainability reporting could fulfil a piece of that 
monitoring role. 
One key limitation to the study was omitting a key variable that has been shown to be an 
important determinant of profitability – R&D investment.  McWilliams and Siegel (2000) 
suggested that these inconsistencies between CSR and profitability are due to misspecifications 
in the model by omitting R&D investment.  R&D investment is linked to improvements in long-
run economic performance (Griliches, 1979); (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991); (Hall 1999).  If 
R&D is found to have a positive impact on firm performance, then it would make sense to 
include the variable within the regression to avoid overestimation in others that are closely 
related to R&D investments.  Unlike findings from McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis (1988) 
that indicate prior performance being more closely related to CSR, this study finds that 
subsequent performance is linked to engagement in CSR.   
For future research, adjustments could be made for differences in industry profitability.  
Taking the difference between the individual firm’s profitability and its industry median should 
be accounted for, as it is less affected by the influence of outliers.  By comparing a company’s 
performance to industry peers (benchmarking), we could get insight in a firm’s performance 
relative to firms within its own industry.  As some industries have higher profitability than 
others, seeing how the profitability and CSR relationship will vary by industry could prove 
insightful.  Another suggestion to guide future research would be to include another dummy 
regressor indicating whether or not reports were assured or not.  Including this assurance variable 
could help show if assuring reports is another viable means towards generating returns, as the 
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 credibility of reports is enhanced by an auditor. 
One last suggestion would be to obtain data across multiple years to assess the long-term 
impact of sustainability reporting on firm profitability.  Using long-term financial data could 
indicate whether sustainability reporting is a worthwhile investment for the long term and not 
just a short-term remedy for firms to enhance profitability.  This would show over time whether 
or not CSR enhances profitability, diminishes it over time, has a neutral impact, or even taking 
an inverse exponential growth trajectory, increasing sharply in the rewards to firms in the short-
term, but ultimately plateauing in the long run as it may become a routine procedure for all 
corporations.  All further extensions of this research could prove promising. 
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 Appendix A: Variable Description 










Don't Report = 0 & Report = 1  2015 
Ownership (Control) % Held By Insiders inside Yahoo Finance Total number of shares owned 
by insiders divided by the total 
shares outstanding 
2016 
% Held By 
Institutions 
institution Yahoo Finance Ownership stake in a company 





Profit Margin (%) ros Yahoo Finance Net Income/Revenue 2016 
Return on Assets (%) roa Yahoo Finance Net Income/Total Assets 2016 
Return on Equity (%) roe Yahoo Finance Net Income/Shareholder Equity 2016 
Size (Control) Revenue (in billions) revenuebil~s Yahoo Finance Income received during a specific 
period 
2016 
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